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Thinking dispositionsa b s t r a c t
Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and
social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions
have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories,
but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined
associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dis-
positions in a British sample (N = 990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy
theories was signiﬁcantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness
and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2–4, we examined the causational role played
by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N = 112), we showed
that a verbal ﬂuency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theo-
ries. In Study 3 (N = 189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic think-
ing, which related to cognitive disﬂuency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in
a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general popu-
lation sample (N = 140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy
theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential
utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the
widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Conspiracy theories can be described as ‘‘a subset of
false beliefs in which the ultimate cause of an event is
believed to be due to a plot by multiple actors working
together with a clear goal in mind, often unlawfully and
in secret’’ (Swami & Furnham, 2014, p. 220). For example,
conspiracy theories relating to the disappearance of Amelia
Earhart and Fred Noonan propose that, rather than crash-
ing at sea, the Japanese military downed their aircraft asthey were spying on the Japanese in the Paciﬁc at the
request of the Roosevelt administration (Swami &
Furnham, 2012). Such conspiracy theories are widespread:
using four nationally representative surveys, sampled
between 2006 and 2011, Oliver and Wood (2014a)
reported that half of the American public endorsed at least
one conspiracy theory. From this perspective, a conspirato-
rial worldview appears to be a relatively widespread ten-
dency across ideological spectra, rather than the aberrant
expression of political extremists or the outcome of psy-
chopathological minds (for a review, see Swami &
Furnham, 2014).
In addition to being widespread, conspiracy theories
have negative social, health, and civic outcomes. For exam-
ple, although belief in conspiracy theories may foster
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allow actors to challenge dominant ideological structures
(Sapountzis & Condor, 2013), there is also evidence that
exposure to conspiracy theories reduces intention to
engage in politics, to reduce one’s carbon footprint (Jolley
& Douglas, 2014a), to vaccinate (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b;
Kata, 2010), and to engage in positive health behaviours
(Oliver & Wood, 2014b). In addition, belief in conspiracy
theories has been associated with riskier sexual attitudes
and behaviours in diverse samples (e.g., Ford, Wallace,
Newman, Lee, & Cunningham, 2013; Gaston & Alleyne-
Green, 2013; Hutchinson et al., 2007), less egalitarian
human rights attitudes (Swami et al., 2012), racist atti-
tudes (Baer, 2013; Swami, 2012), and political violence
(Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta, & Wójcik, 2013).
Given these issues, understanding the psychosocial ori-
gins of belief in conspiracy theories remains an important
task for scholars. To this end, a small body of work has
examined the form and content of conspiracy theories
(e.g., Bost & Prunier, 2013; Raab, Auer, Ortlieb, & Carbon,
2013; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013), the context in
which conspiracy theories ﬂourish (e.g., Grzesiak-
Feldman, 2013; Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014), and
the linguistic styles of conspiracy theorists (e.g., Wood &
Douglas, 2013). Concurrently, a larger body of research
has focused on individual difference correlates of belief in
conspiracy theories, overturning an earlier approach that
attempted to pathologise such beliefs (e.g., Groh, 1987;
Robins & Post, 1997). This perspective is based on the
notion that it is possible to measure conspiracist ideation
as an individual difference trait (Brotherton, French, &
Pickering, 2013; Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, &
Imhoff, 2013), which in turn will be correlated with other
psychological antecedents.
Thus, studies have reported relatively reliable associa-
tions between stronger belief in conspiracy theories and
a number of psychological constructs, such as greater dis-
trust in authority, higher political cynicism, lower self-
esteem, greater authoritarianism, and paranormal beliefs
(Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999;
Brotherton et al., 2013; Bruder et al., 2013; Imhoff &
Bruder, 2013; Stieger, Gumhalter, Tran, Voracek, &
Swami, 2013; Swami, 2012; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic,
& Furnham, 2010; Swami & Furnham, 2012; Swami et al.,
2011). In addition, several studies have examined associa-
tions between belief in conspiracy theories and the Big Five
personality domains, but results have been equivocal with
some studies reporting signiﬁcant associations with Open-
ness to Experience and Agreeableness (Furnham, 2013;
Swami & Furnham, 2012; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013)
and others reporting weak or no signiﬁcant associations
(Brotherton et al., 2013; Bruder et al., 2013; Imhoff &
Bruder, 2013).
Another class of studies has focused on reasoning biases
and heuristics in conspiracist ideation (McHoskey, 1995).
Clarke (2002), for example, proposed that belief in conspir-
acy theories could be explained in terms of the fundamen-
tal attribution error: conspiracy theorists, he suggested, are
more likely to make a dispositional inference about per-
soniﬁed actors, even when adequate situational explana-
tions are available. Other scholars have reported thatconspiracist beliefs may be a product of a representative-
ness heuristic, that is, a tendency to accept explanations
that are proportional to the consequences of an event
(Leman & Cinnirella, 2007). Most recently, Brotherton
and French (2014) found that belief in conspiracy theories
was associated with susceptibility to the conjunction fal-
lacy, that is, an error of probabilistic reasoning where indi-
viduals overestimate the likelihood of co-occurring events.
These studies point to reasoning biases as a possible
antecedent of belief in conspiracy theories, but it is also
possible they reﬂect broader associations with cognitive
ability. For example, some research has indicated that per-
formance on tasks of heuristics and biases is modestly
related cognitive ability (e.g., Stanovich & West, 1999,
2000); cognitive ability, in turn, is associated with belief
in conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2011; see also
Swami & Furnham, 2012), which hints at a possible medi-
atory link. Another possibility is that the association
between susceptibility to biases and heuristics and con-
spiracist ideation is underpinned by thinking dispositions
that shape how individuals seek, interpret, and contest
the legitimacy of evidence (Leman, 2007). Certainly, per-
formance on tasks of heuristics and biases have been found
to be modestly correlated with thinking dispositions (e.g.,
West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008), but associations between
the latter and conspiracist ideation have been infrequently
studied.
In one study, Leman and Cinnirella (2013) examined
associations between belief in conspiracy theories and
need for cognitive closure (i.e., a preference for order and
structure, closed-mindedness, and discomfort with ambi-
guity), but reported no signiﬁcant correlation (r = .05,
N = 30). On the other hand, there is evidence that those
aspects of schizotypy that mirror disorganised thought
processes and a rejection of analytic information genera-
tion are signiﬁcantly associated with belief in conspiracy
theories (Barron, Morgan, Towell, Altemeyer, & Swami,
2014; Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011). Relatedly, a grow-
ing body of evidence suggests that belief in conspiracy the-
ories is associated with the rejection of scientiﬁc ﬁndings,
particularly but not limited to climate change (e.g.,
Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013; Lewandowsky,
Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013), as well as belief in contradic-
tory statements (Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012). Other
work has shown that analytic, cognitively-focused inocula-
tion messages are effective at reducing the effectiveness of
conspiracy theories (Banas & Miller, 2013). More broadly,
commentators have highlighted the importance of differ-
ent thinking dispositions – particularly the ability to think
critically – as a means of helping individuals recognise,
understand, and avoid prioristic conspiracist messages
(e.g., Blair, 2012).
Thus, while thinking dispositions may seem to be, con-
ceptually at least, a plausible antecedent of belief in con-
spiracy theories, evidence of associations to date have
been equivocal and piecemeal. In the present study, then,
we adopted two complementary strategies to examine
whether individual differences in thinking dispositions
are associated with belief in conspiracy theories. Study 1
was a correlational study with British participants, in
which we examined associations between belief in
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thinking dispositions that we identiﬁed as being poten-
tially relevant. Next, to establish causation, we examined
whether an experimental manipulation that is known to
increase analytic processing would reduce general belief
in conspiracy theories (Study 2). In Study 3, we tested for
robustness using an alternative experimental technique
also known to increase analytic processing. Finally, in
Study 4, we examined whether increasing analytic pro-
cessing of information would also reduce belief in a spe-
ciﬁc conspiracy theory, as opposed to general belief in
conspiracy theories.2. Study 1
Study 1 was a correlational study that examined associ-
ations between belief in conspiracy theories and a broad
range of thinking dispositions that we identiﬁed as being
potentially relevant. First, one of the most appealing psy-
chological theories for understanding conspiracy theories
is the notion of two independent information processing
systems (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994;
Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), namely an experiential or intui-
tive system (fast, automatic, governed by habit, susceptible
to affective reactions, and difﬁcult to control consciously)
and an analytic or rational system (conscious, deliberate,
effortful, slow, affectively-neutral, and rule-based). Of the
two systems, it is the experiential system that will likely
show a signiﬁcant positive correlation with belief in con-
spiracy theories. Not only does this system enhance reli-
ance on feelings evoked by information (and conspiracy
theories are often affect-laden; Sunstein & Vermeule,
2009), it is also positively associated with traits that are
known to be associated with conspiracist ideation (e.g.,
Agreeableness; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) and a preference
for heuristic solutions (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, &
Heier, 1996). On the other hand, an analytic thinking style
should be negatively associated with belief in conspiracy
theories, as it prompts more careful information process-
ing, thereby increasing attention on content and evidence
(Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). In addition, this think-
ing style is associated with measures that are negatively
associated with belief in conspiracy theories (e.g., self-
esteem; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Pacini, Muir, & Epstein,
1998) and with correct normative responses on tests of
cognitive bias (Epstein et al., 1996).
Besides information processing styles, another thinking
disposition that may be associated with belief in conspir-
acy theories is the dimension of open-mindedness (which
should not be confused with the Big Five facet of Openness
to Experience). Stanovich andWest (1997) described open-
minded thinking as a tendency to favour contemplative
over impetuous behaviour, a tendency to analyse options
and alternative perspectives, questioning one’s own
assumptions, and welcoming different possibilities.
Actively-open minded thinking includes the notion of ﬂex-
ibility, outward seeking of knowledge, and openness,
which have been highlighted as cornerstones of critical
thinking (Baron, 2008). In one previous study of children
(Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002),thinking dispositions as measured through open-minded
thinking and need for cognition was signiﬁcantly associ-
ated with analytic reasoning, once the effects of cognitive
ability was controlled. As such, it stands to reason that
there will be a negative association between actively-open
minded thinking and belief in conspiracy theories.
In a similar vein, need for cognition may be another
useful predictor of individual differences in conspiracist
ideation. Need for cognition refers to dispositional differ-
ences in cognitive motivation and reﬂects an intrinsic
motivation to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive
endeavours (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty,
Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Individuals who score highly on
need for cognition are more likely to attend to, elaborate,
evaluate, and recall information (e.g., Peltier &
Schibrowsky, 1994) and less dogmatic (Cacioppo & Petty,
1982), which hints at a possible negative association with
belief in conspiracy theories. In contrast, a need for closure
can be deﬁned as a desire for ‘‘an answer on a given topic,
any answer. . . compared to confusion and ambiguity’’
(Kruglanski, 1990; p. 337), which suggests a positive rela-
tionship with belief in conspiracy theories. Although
Leman and Cinnirella (2013) failed to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
association between these variables in their study, we
included need for cognition in the present work to examine
associations using a larger sample.
In short, in Study 1, we sought to examine the extent to
which individual differences in thinking dispositions are
associated with belief in conspiracy theories. The focus
on thinking dispositions is unlikely to be misplaced: these
dispositions not only provide an indication of what indi-
viduals are able to do, but also how they typically invest
their cognitive abilities (Perkins, Tishman, Ritchhart,
Donis, & Andrade, 2000). Broadly speaking, thinking dispo-
sitions can be viewed as a constraint of the cognitive sys-
tem that has the potential to shape information
processing and assimilation of illogical, contradictory, or
factually incorrect arguments. Here, we predicted that
belief in conspiracy theories would be positively associated
with experiential thinking styles and need for closure, and




The participants of this study were 990 British residents
(560 women, 430 men) recruited from the community in
London, UK. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 71 years
(M = 32.79, SD = 13.99). The majority of the sample was of
British White descent (93.5%) and, in terms of educational
qualiﬁcations, 13.4% had completed minimum secondary
schooling, 24.4% were still in full-time education, 39.0%
had an undergraduate degree, 13.7% had a postgraduate
degree, and the remainder had some other qualiﬁcation.
2.1.2. Materials
2.1.2.1. Belief in conspiracy theories. To measure general
conspiracist ideation or belief in conspiracy theories, we
used the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI;
Swami et al., 2010, 2011), which consists of 15 items that
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item: ‘A powerful and secretive group, known as the New
World Order, are planning to eventually rule the world
through an autonomous world government, which would
replace sovereign governments’). All items are rated on a
9-point scale (1 = Completely false, 9 = Completely true)
and an overall score is computed as the mean of all items,
with higher scores reﬂecting stronger belief in conspiracy
theories. Scores on this measure have been shown to have
a one-dimensional factor structure with good internal con-
sistency (Swami et al., 2010, 2011) and are very strongly
correlated with scores from a generic measure of conspir-
acist ideation (r = .88; Brotherton et al., 2013). In the pres-
ent work, Cronbach’s a for this measure was .91.
2.1.2.2. Experiential and analytic thinking styles. Participants
completed the 42-item Rational/Experiential Multimodal
Inventory (REIm; Norris & Epstein, 2011), a revision of
the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al.,
1996). The REIm contains 12 items that measure an ana-
lytic thinking style (a tendency to solve problems through
understanding of logical principles and the evaluation of
evidence; sample item: ‘I enjoy problems that require
hard thinking’) and 30 items that measure an experiential
thinking style. The latter consists of three 10-item sub-
scales, namely Intuition (a tendency to solve problems
intuitively and based on affect; sample item: ‘I often go
by my instincts when deciding on a course of action’),
Emotionality (a preference for intense and frequent
strong affect; sample item: ‘I’d rather be upset sometimes
and happy sometimes, than always feel calm’), and Imag-
ination (a tendency to engage in, and appreciate, imagina-
tion, aesthetics productions, and imagery; sample item: ‘I
have favourite poems and paintings that mean a lot to
me’). All items are rated on a 5-point scale (1 = Strongly
disagree, 5 = Strongly agree) and subscale scores are com-
puted as the mean of associated items. Norris and
Epstein (2011) reported that these subscales have good
discriminant validity and acceptable internal consistency
coefﬁcients. Cronbach’s a coefﬁcients in the present study
were as follows: Rational, .86; Intuition, .74; Emotional-
ity, .76; Imagination, .72.
2.1.2.3. Open-minded thinking. To measure open-minded
thinking, we used the Actively-Open Minded Thinking
scale (AOT; Stanovich & West, 2007). Although there have
been multiple versions of the AOT scale (e.g., Stanovich &
West, 1997; Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999) consisting of
different combinations of items and subscales, the most
current version includes 41 items that measure facets of
open-minded thinking, including ﬂexible thinking, open-
ness, dogmatism, categorical thinking, belief identiﬁcation,
and counterfactual thinking (sample item: ‘People should
always take into consideration evidence that goes against
their beliefs’). Items are rated on a 6-point scale
(1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree). Although there
is some debate as to the factor structure of the AOT
(Marsh & Pastor, 2011), Stanovich andWest (2007) suggest
calculating an AOT scale total score by averaging partici-
pant responses across all 41 items, such that higher scores
reﬂect more actively open-minded thinking. They reportthat the total score has good internal consistency coefﬁ-
cients and provide evidence of adequate convergent valid-
ity. In the present study, Cronbach’s a for this measure was
.76.2.1.2.4. Need for cognition. Need for cognition was mea-
sured using the 18-item Need for Cognition Scale (NCogS;
Cacioppo et al., 1996). This scale measures dispositional
differences in intrinsic motivation to engage in and enjoy
effortful cognitive endeavours (sample item: ‘The notion
of thinking abstractly is appealing to me’). Items are rated
on a 6-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree)
and an overall score is computed as the mean of all items.
Higher scores on this scale reﬂect greater need for cogni-
tion. The scale has been shown to have acceptable psycho-
metric properties (Cacioppo et al., 1996), including good
internal consistency coefﬁcients (West et al., 2008). In
the present study, Cronbach’s a for this scale was .84.2.1.2.5. Need for closure. Participants were asked to com-
plete a brief version of the Need for Closure Scale (NCloS;
Roets & van Hiel, 2011). This is a 15-item revision of the
revised 41-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets & van Hiel,
2007) that assesses an individual’s inclination to ‘seize’
on closure quickly and a desire to maintain or ‘freeze’ on
closure (sample item: ‘I don’t like situations that are uncer-
tain’). All items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = Com-
pletely disagree, 5 = Completely agree). An overall score is
computed as the mean of all items, with higher scores on
this scale reﬂecting greater need for closure. Evidence of
good psychometric properties for the brief NCloS was pro-
vided by Roets and van Hiel (2011). In the present study,
Cronbach’s a for this measure was .89.2.1.2.6. Demographics. Participants provided their demo-
graphic details consisting of sex, age, ethnicity, and highest
educational qualiﬁcations.2.1.3. Procedure
Ethics approval for all studies reported here was
obtained from the relevant university ethics committee.
Eight research assistants trained in psychological meth-
ods recruited participants opportunistically from several
public locations in Greater London. Potential participants
who met inclusion criteria (of adult age and resident in
Britain) were invited to take part in a study on their
thinking styles and were provided with an information
sheet that brieﬂy described the study. Once participation
had been agreed, participants provided written informed
consent and completed an anonymous paper-and-pencil
survey in a quiet location setup for the purposes of the
study. The order of presentation of the above scales in
the survey was pre-randomised for each participant.
Upon completion and return of the survey, participants
were provided with a debrief sheet that contained further
information about the study and the contact information
of the ﬁrst author. All participants took part on a volun-
tary basis and were not remunerated for participation.
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Missing data (less than 2% of the total dataset) were
replaced using the mean replacement technique. Descrip-
tive statistics (M and SD) for, and bivariate correlations
between, all variables included in this study are reported
in Table 1. As can be seen, belief in conspiracy theories
was signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with an analytic
thinking style and open-minded thinking, and positively
correlated with intuitive thinking style and need for clo-
sure. In general, correlations between belief in conspiracy
theories and thinking styles were of a small-to-medium
effect size, while those with open-minded thinking and
need for closure were of a small effect size (Cohen,
1988). We next conducted a multiple linear regression
model with belief in conspiracy theory as the criterion
variable and all remaining variables entered simulta-
neously as predictors. Results showed that the regression
model was signiﬁcant, F(7, 979) = 12.27, p < .001, Adj.
R2 = .08. Multicollinearity diagnostics indicated that mul-
ticollinearity was not a limiting factor in this regression
model (all VIFs < 1.53). As seen in Table 2, greater belief
in conspiracy theories was signiﬁcantly predicted by
lower analytic thinking style, greater intuitive thinking,
and lower open-minded thinking.
The results of Study 1 indicate that belief in conspiracy
theories is associated with individual differences in think-
ing dispositions. In particular, we found that stronger
belief in conspiracy theories was associated with a lesser
tendency to rely on deliberative, analytic processing of
information and a greater tendency to rely on frugal,
intuitive information processing. These ﬁndings are con-
sistent with the suggestion that a more analytic thinking
style, which is associated with more careful information
processing, gives individuals the tools and space with
which to critically evaluate conspiracy theories, especially
those that are illogical or lacking in evidence. A more
analytic thinking style is also correlated with correct nor-
mative responses on tests of cognitive bias (Epstein et al.,
1996), which in turn may also contribute to lower belief
in conspiracy theories. Likewise, greater open-minded-
ness – which is associated with analytic reasoning
(Kokis et al., 2002) was associated with lower belief inTable 1
Descriptive statistics for, and bivariate correlations between, all variables include
(1) (2) (3)
(1) Belief in conspiracy theories .25** .21**
(2) Rational thinking style .09*
(3) Intuitive thinking style
(4) Emotional thinking style
(5) Imaginative thinking style
(6) Actively open-minded thinking
(7) Need for cognition
(8) Need for closure
M 3.10 3.57 3.28
SD 1.36 0.76 0.62
Note: N = 990.
* p < .05.
** p < .001.conspiracy theories once the effects of other variables
had been taken into account. In short, the emerging pic-
ture is one of an analytic thinking style and open-mind-
edness being associated with lower conspiracist ideation.
Conversely, a greater tendency to think intuitively, as
opposed to emotionally or imaginatively, was associated
with greater belief in conspiracy theories. The Intuition
subscale of the REIm is thought to measure a general ten-
dency to process information experientially, that is, to
solve problems intuitively and based on affect (Norris &
Epstein, 2011). The association of scores on this subscale
with belief in conspiracy theories is consistent with the
suggestion that conspiracy theories are often affect-laden
or are related to highly salient and emotive events
(Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). In addition, to the extent
that conspiracy theories thrive in situations marked by
crippled epistemologies (Hardin, 2002), a greater ten-
dency to think intuitively may promote acceptance of
conspiracy theories that require low cognitive effort.
Finally, an intuitive thinking style promotes a preference
for heuristic solutions (Epstein et al., 1996), which in turn
have been associated with greater belief in conspiracy
theories (Brotherton & French, 2014; Clarke, 2002;
Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; McHoskey, 1995).
In our multiple regression model, we found that both
need for cognition and need for closure did not emerge
as signiﬁcant predictors of belief in conspiracy theories.
These weak associations are generally consistent with pre-
vious studies reporting no signiﬁcant association between
belief in conspiracy theories and need for closure (Leman &
Cinnirella, 2013) and tolerance of ambiguity (Abalakina-
Paap et al., 1999). It is possible that these variables affect
belief in conspiracy theories indirectly (Leman &
Cinnirella, 2013); that is, they may mediate the relation-
ship between conspiracist ideation and more distal predic-
tors, such as Openness to Experience. This may be a fruitful
avenue for future research, as would replication of the
present ﬁndings with a more representative sample or
samples from different cultural backgrounds. In addition,
the primary limitation of Study 1 is the reliance on a corre-
lational design, which limits our ability to draw causation-
al conclusions. This is an issue we sought to address using
an experimental methodology in Study 2.d in Study 1.
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
.05 .04 .07* .01 .07*
.17** .13** .38** .35** .08*
.25** .39** .15** .01 .08*




3.35 3.78 3.59 3.63 3.39
0.65 0.70 0.42 0.66 0.78
Table 2
Standardised and unstandardised regression coefﬁcients for the multiple linear regression conducted in Study 1 with belief in conspiracy theories as the
criterion variable.
B SE b t p VIF
Rational thinking style .42 .07 .22 6.04 <.001 1.29
Intuitive thinking style .26 .08 .12 3.42 .001 1.28
Emotional thinking style .13 .08 .06 1.67 .095 1.42
Imaginative thinking style .16 .12 .05 1.31 .189 1.53
Actively open-minded thinking .13 .06 .07 2.08 .038 1.29
Need for cognition .05 .08 .02 0.63 .531 1.45
Need for closure .05 .06 .03 0.93 .351 1.19
Note: VIF = Variance Inﬂation Factor.
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The results of Study 1 indicated that a greater tendency
toward analytic thinking was the strongest predictor of
belief in conspiracy theories of the variables we identiﬁed
as being potentially relevant. In Study 2, we sought to
establish causation by testing whether an experimental
manipulation that implicitly promoted analytic processing
of information would reduce belief in conspiracy theories.
There are reasons to think that this manipulation should be
successful and that it may be possible to reduce an individ-
ual’s belief in conspiracy theories. First, previous studies
have shown that informational framing inﬂuences belief
in conspiracy theories, such that information that is sup-
portive of a conspiratorial explanation promotes belief
(Butler, Koopman, & Zimbardo, 1995), whereas critical
information results in an attenuation of conspiracist beliefs
(Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; Swami et al., 2013).
Indeed, Swami et al. (2013) reported that this supportive
versus critical message bias had quite a large effect
(d = 1.15) on subsequent agreement or disagreement with
a conspiracy theory.
Additionally, Banas and Miller (2013) have shown that
it is possible to inoculate against a conspiracy theory
through the use of analytic, cognitively-focused communi-
cation efforts. More speciﬁcally, the authors showed that a
fact-based message that dispelled some of the factual
errors in a conspiracy theory was effective at inducing
resistance compared to a control message. Likewise, a
logic-based message that attempted to show how the con-
spiracy theory was not logical was also effective at induc-
ing resistance, though not to the same extent as the factual
message. Taken together, the available evidence suggests
that it may be possible to reduce belief in conspiracy the-
ories by promoting a more analytic thinking style. Because
conspiracy theories often employ counter-factual argu-
ments (e.g., circular reasoning, repetition of unproven pre-
mises, non-falsiﬁability, and logical ﬂaws; Miller, 2002),
promoting a tendency to think analytically should reduce
agreement with unsound, illogical arguments. Analytic
thinking may also impact on belief in conspiracy theories
in other ways. For example, one hallmark of conspiracy
theories is the notion that component events of a phenom-
enon and/or phenomena are causally connected (Bale,
2007). By detaching components of a phenomenon from
its context and focusing attention on the attributes of each
component (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001),analytic thinking may disrupt perceptions of causal con-
nectedness inherent in conspiracist ideation.
Analogous support also comes from studies showing
that analytic thinking predicts reasoning performance on
laboratory tasks (Stanovich & West, 2000), as well as belief
systems; speciﬁcally, individuals who engage in analytic
thinking are less likely to hold speciﬁc religious and para-
normal beliefs (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook,
Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Shenhav, Rand,
& Greene, 2012). Although analogies between religious
and/or paranormal beliefs and conspiracist ideation should
be drawn with extreme caution, it is possible that analytic
thinking helps to disrupt belief in conspiracy theories by
helping individuals detect logical conﬂicts inherent in such
theories (cf. Pennycook et al., 2012). Implicit in this per-
spective is the idea that individuals who very strongly
believe in conspiracy theories because they may be less
likely to detect the afore-mentioned logical and reasoning
fallacies.
In Study 2, then, we tested the possibility that analytic
thinking attenuates conspiracist ideation by examining
whether a scrambled-sentence task priming procedure
would reduce belief in conspiracy theories. Recent studies
have used modiﬁed versions of this priming procedure to
effectively activate analytic thinking without explicit
awareness on the part of participants (Gervais &
Norenzayan, 2012; Uhlmann, Poehlman, Tannenbaum, &
Bargh, 2011). Participants completed a measure of belief
in conspiracy theories several weeks before and immedi-
ately after the priming task. Based on the results of previ-
ous studies (Banas & Miller, 2013; Swami et al., 2013), as
well as the ﬁndings of Study 1, we expected that partici-
pants in the analytic priming condition would show
weaker belief in conspiracy theories following the experi-
mental manipulation compared with participants in a con-
trol condition.3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
The participants of this study were 112 undergraduates
(66 women, 46 men) at a university in London, UK, who
were randomly assigned to either the Analytic (n = 58) or
Control (n = 54) prime. Participants had a mean age of
19.54 years (SD = 3.06) and the majority were of British
White descent (75.9%; Asian = 20.5%; other = 3.6%).
Fig. 1. Belief in conspiracy theories pre- and post-manipulation among
participants in the Analytic and Control conditions in Study 2.
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Participants were primed using a modiﬁed version of
the scrambled-sentence verbal ﬂuency task (Srull &
Wyer, 1979, 1980; modiﬁcation: Gervais & Norenzayan,
2012). In this task, participants were initially told they
would be taking part in a ‘verbal ﬂuency’ task in which
they were given ten sets of ﬁve words in a nonsense order.
Four of the words comprised a viable sentence and partic-
ipants were instructed to drop one word and unscramble
the remaining words to form a phrase (e.g., ‘‘man away
postcard the walked’’ becomes ‘‘the man walked away’’).
In the Analytic condition, ﬁve of the word sets contained
a target prime word related to analytic or rational reason-
ing (analyse, reason, ponder, think, rational). In the Control
condition, the scrambled sentences contained neutral
words (e.g., chair, shop).
Although the target prime words related to analytic rea-
soning were identical to those used in a previous study
(Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012), the additional words and
ﬁnal phrases were different. To ensure that this priming
procedure elicited analytic processing, we conducted a
pilot study with 68 undergraduates (42 women, 26 men;
age M = 19.02 years, SD = 2.96) who were subsequently
excluded from participation in the main study. Following
Gervais and Norenzayan (2012), pilot participants were
randomly assigned to complete either the Analytic prime
(n = 32) or the Control prime (n = 36). They then answered
the one-item Moses Illusion task (Erickson & Mattson,
1981; ‘How many of each kind of animal did Moses take
on the Ark?’), a measure used to assess analytic versus
experiential processing (Song & Schwarz, 2008a). Results
showed that participants were signiﬁcantly more likely
to respond with the correct answer (e.g., ‘Moses did not
have an ark’ or ‘Cannot say’) in the Analytic condition
(31%) compared with the Control condition (8%),
v2(1) = 5.75, p = .016.
3.1.3. Design and procedure
At the start of a teaching semester, students enrolled on
an introductory course in psychology were invited to par-
ticipate in the study voluntarily. They completed a survey
presented on a computer terminal in a private cubicle.
The survey included the BCTI as described in Study 1
(a = .87), as well as ﬁller scales unrelated to the present
study, which we included in order to help mask the study
hypothesis, and a request for participant demographics
(sex, age, ethnicity). All items from the different measures
were presented in a randomised order for each participant
in blocks of 20 items per screen-page. As required by the
ethics committee, nominal codes were used to link the
data from this testing session with later data without
breaching the participants’ right to anonymity.
Approximately ﬁve weeks after the initial survey was
completed, participants were invited to complete the sec-
ond part of the study. We had a very low attrition rate:
only six participants who could not be contacted at this
stage were omitted from the study. Participants completed
the experiment on a computer terminal in a private cubi-
cle. All instructions were fully automated onscreen in order
to minimise possible experimenter bias. As discussed by
Gervais and Norenzayan (2012), participants wereinformed that they would be participating in several unre-
lated ‘mini-studies’ in a random order. In fact, participants
completed the priming task, followed by the BCTI (a = .89)
and distractor scales, whose items were presented in a ran-
domised order. In a post-experiment debrieﬁng, none of
the participants correctly guessed the study hypothesis.
3.2. Results and discussion
Preliminary analyses showed that there were no signif-
icant differences between the Analytic and Control groups
in mean age, t(110) = 1.05, p = .297, d = 0.20, the distribu-
tion of sexes, v2(1) = 1.49, p = .222, and the distribution
of ethnic groups, v2(2) = 4.96, p = .084, suggesting the ran-
domisation process was successful. We next conducted a 2
(experimental condition: Analytic versus Control)  2
(Testing Session: Pre-manipulation versus Post-manipula-
tion) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA),
where the former variable was the between-subjects factor
and the latter variable the within-subjects factor. Belief in
conspiracy theories was entered as the dependent variable.
The ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant interaction,
F(1,110) = 5.77, p = .018, gp2 = .05, conﬁrming that the
experimental manipulation had an impact on belief in con-
spiracy theories (see Fig. 1).
During the ﬁrst testing session, there was no difference
in belief in conspiracy theories between participants in the
Analytic (M = 3.21, SD = 1.29) and Control (M = 3.27,
SD = 1.48) conditions, t(110) = 0.23, p = .820, d = 0.04. How-
ever, after the experimental manipulation, participants in
the Analytic condition (M = 2.63, SD = 1.08) had signiﬁ-
cantly lower belief in conspiracy theories compared with
participants in the Control condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.43),
t(110) = 2.40, p = .018, d = 0.46. There was also a signiﬁcant
main effect of testing session, F(1,110) = 9.03, p = .003,
gp2 = .08, with a general decline in belief in conspiracy the-
ories over time, but no main effect of experimental condi-
tion, F(1,110) = 1.94, p = .166, gp2 = .02.
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experimental manipulation designed to activate analytic
thinking (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Uhlmann et al.,
2011) was effective at reducing belief in conspiracy theo-
ries. Although there was no signiﬁcant difference in con-
spiracist beliefs prior to the experimental manipulation,
participants in the Analytic condition showed signiﬁcantly
lower belief in conspiracy theories post-manipulation
compared to participants in the Control condition. In other
words, implicitly priming concepts related to analytic
thinking led our participants to endorse lower conspiracist
beliefs. Furthermore, based on Cohen (1988), the experi-
mental manipulation in Study 2 had a medium effect size.
Furthermore, as noted by Gervais and Norenzayan (2012),
one possible – though unlikely – explanation for ﬁndings
such as those in Study 2 is that the act of having to perform
a task (any task, not just tasks known to encourage analytic
thinking) decreases belief in conspiracy theories.4. Study 3
In Study 3, we sought to examine the robustness of the
main ﬁnding of Study 2 that encouraging analytic thinking
decreases belief in conspiracy theories. Here, we utilised an
experimental manipulation that did not require partici-
pants to perform an initial task to activate analytic think-
ing, thereby, excluding one possible alternative
explanation for the results in Study 2. Speciﬁcally, in Study
3, we manipulated processing ﬂuency, which previous
studies have shown to be associated with analytic thinking
styles. For example, presenting information in difﬁcult-to-
read fonts is known to improve performance on measures
of analytic thinking, including syllogistic reasoning (Alter,
Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007) and the Moses Illusion
task (Song & Schwarz, 2008a; see also Study 2), as well as
memory tasks (Diemand-Yauman, Oppenheimer, &
Vaughan, 2011). In explanation, it has been suggested that
cognitive disﬂuency serves to trigger analytic thinking
strategies because it requires deeper processing of infor-
mation (for a review, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Fol-
lowing evidence that this manipulation promotes religious
disbelief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012), we examined




Participants of Study 3 were 189 undergraduates (117
women, 72 men) at a university in Greater London who
had a mean age of 19.72 years (SD = 4.39) and of whom
the majority (86.0%) were of British White descent
(Asian = 10.0%; other = 4.0%).
4.1.2. Design and procedure
At the start of a teaching semester, students enrolled on
a non-psychology course were invited to take part in the
study on a voluntary basis. They completed a paper-and-
pencil survey packet that contained the BCTI (a = .88),
along with a number of additional ﬁller scales not relatedto the present work and a request for demographic details
(sex, age, ethnicity). All items from the different scales
were presented in a randomised order for each participant
and, as required by the ethics committee, nominal codes
were used to link participant data between testing ses-
sions. Four weeks after completing the ﬁrst survey, partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to either the Control
(n = 95) or Disﬂuent group (n = 94) and were invited to
complete a second paper-and-pencil survey.
The present work followed Gervais and Norenzayan
(2012) in manipulating cognitive disﬂuency using a difﬁ-
cult-to-read font. In this paradigm, participants in both
conditions complete an identical survey, but presented in
different formats: participants in the Control condition
completed the survey in an easy-to-read, typical font,
while participants in the Disﬂuent group completed the
survey in a difﬁcult-to-read font. Following Song and
Schwarz (2008a), the easy-to-read survey used a black
Arial font with font size 12 (e.g., this is a sample text),
while the difﬁcult-to-read survey used a grey Brush Script
MT font with font size twelve (e.g., this is a sample text). In a
pilot study, we asked 49 undergraduates (30 women, 19
men; age M = 19.99, SD = 3.02) who were excluded from
the main study to rate the ease with which they could read
the text (1 = Very easy, 7 = Very difﬁcult). Conﬁrming previ-
ous ﬁndings (Song & Schwarz, 2008a), the Brush Script MT
font (M = 5.96, SD = 0.96) was rated as signiﬁcantly more
difﬁcult to read than the Arial font (M = 4.04, SD = 1.11),
t(47) = 6.50, p < .001, d = 1.90.
In the main study, the two versions of the anonymised
survey were presented to participants to be completed
individually in a lecture theatre setting. Because the pre-
sentation format of instructions can affect perceptions of
the difﬁculty of executing a behaviour, which in turn
affects willingness to engage in that behaviour (Song &
Schwarz, 2008b), all participants were given the same ver-
bal instructions by a single researcher. Additional research
assistants ensured that participants did not confer while
completing the surveys. The experimental survey included
the BCTI (a = .90), as well as distractor scales not relevant
to the current study. All scales were presented in a ran-
domised order for all participants. Twelve participants
who were not present on both days of testing were
excluded from the study. In a post-experiment debrieﬁng,
none of the participants correctly identiﬁed the study’s
purpose. All participants received written debrieﬁng infor-
mation and were not remunerated for participation.
4.2. Results and discussion
Preliminary analyses showed that there were no signif-
icant differences between the Disﬂuent and Control groups
in mean age, t(187) = 0.82, p = .416, d = 0.12, the distribu-
tion of sexes, v2(1) = 2.08, p = .150, and the distribution
of ethnic groups, v2(2) = 0.69, p = .875. This suggests that
our randomisation process was successful.
We next conducted a 2 (experimental condition: Disﬂu-
ent versus Control)  2 (Testing Session: Pre-manipulation
versus Post-manipulation) repeated-measures ANOVA. Belief
in conspiracy theories was the dependent variable, the
experimental condition was treated as a between-subjects
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factor. The ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant interaction,
F(1,187) = 4.56, p = .034, gp2 = .02, conﬁrming that the
experimental manipulation had an impact on belief in
conspiracy theories (see Fig. 2).
At the initial testing session, there was no signiﬁcant
difference in belief in conspiracy theories between partici-
pants in the Disﬂuent (M = 3.06, SD = 1.34) and Control
(M = 3.20, SD = 1.39) conditions, t(187) = 0.69, p = .493,
d = 0.10. At the second testing session, however, partici-
pants who had completed the difﬁcult-to-read survey
(M = 2.66, SD = 0.96) reported signiﬁcantly lower belief in
conspiracy theories compared with participants in the
Control condition (M = 3.25, SD = 1.40), t(187) = 3.38,
p = .001, d = 0.49. There was also a signiﬁcant main effect
of the experimental condition, F(1, 187) = 5.56, p = .019,
gp2 = .03, but no main effect of testing session,
F(1,187) = 2.80, p = .096, gp2 = .02.
The results of this study supported our hypothesis. That
is, we found that a manipulation that increased cognitive
disﬂuency and that has been shown to increase perfor-
mance on measures of analytic thinking (Alter et al.,
2007; Song & Schwarz, 2008a) resulted in signiﬁcantly
lower belief in conspiracy theories. Broadly speaking, the
results of Study 3 are consistent with previous work show-
ing that the same manipulation promotes greater religious
disbelief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). Taken in combina-
tion with the results of Study 2, the results of this study
provide additional support for the suggestion that facilitat-
ing analytic thinking results in weaker belief in conspiracy
theories.5. Study 4
Although Studies 2 and 3 indicate that encouraging ana-
lytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories, two
issues limit the conclusions that can be drawn. First, the
reliance on undergraduates in both studies limits theFig. 2. Belief in conspiracy theories pre- and post-manipulation among
participants in the Disﬂuent and Control conditions in Study 3.generalisability of our ﬁndings, especially if the greater
cognitive ability among university students moderates
the effects of cognitive disﬂuency on analytic thinking
(see Thompson, Prowse Turner, Pennycook, et al., 2013;
for a counter-argument, see Alter, Oppenheimer, & Epley,
2013). Second, in Studies 2 and 3, we used a measure of
general belief in conspiracy theories, and so it is possible
that promoting analytic thinking reduces belief in conspir-
acy theories broadly, but not conspiracist ideation
(although scores on the BCTI are strongly correlated with
scores on a generic measure of conspiracist ideation;
Brotherton et al., 2013). In Study 4, then, we examined
the generalisability of the ﬁndings in Study 3 by examining
the impact of encouraging analytic thinking on conspira-
cist ideation among a general population sample. In addi-
tion, we also included a measure of speciﬁc conspiracy
theory (concerning the July 7, 2005, or 7/7, bombings in
London) to examine whether earlier results would extend
to beliefs about a speciﬁc conspiracy theory.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
The participants of Study 4 were 66 women and 74 men
recruited from the community in London, UK. Participants
had a mean age of 33.87 years (SD = 15.05) and the major-
ity were of British White descent (85.0%; Asian = 13.6%;
African Caribbean = 1.4%). In terms of educational qualiﬁ-
cations, 46.4% had completed minimum secondary educa-
tion, 27.9% were still in full-time education, 15.7% had an
undergraduate degree, 5.7% had a postgraduate degree,
and 4.3% had some other qualiﬁcation.
5.1.2. Measures
5.1.2.1. Conspiracist ideation. All participants completed the
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS; Brotherton et al.,
2013). This is 15-item scale that measures individual dif-
ferences in the tendency to engage in conspiracist ideation
(sample item: ‘A small, secret group of people is responsi-
ble for making all major world decisions, such as going to
war’). Items are rated on a 5-point scale (1 = Deﬁnitely not
true, 5 = Deﬁnitely true) and an overall score is computed
as the mean of all items. Higher scores on this scale reﬂect
greater generic conspiracist ideation. Brotherton et al.
(2013) provided evidence of good psychometric properties
for this scale. In the present study, Cronbach’s a for the
GCBS was .91.
5.1.2.2. Belief in 7/7 conspiracy theories. To measure beliefs
about a speciﬁc conspiracy theory, we used a 12-itemmea-
sure of conspiracist beliefs concerning the July 7, 2005,
bombings in London (Swami et al., 2011; sample item:
‘The fact that the UK government is withholding informa-
tion about the 7/7 bombings is evidence of a cover-up’).
Items are rated on a 9-point scale (1 = Completely false,
9 = Completely true). An overall score for this measure is
computed as the mean of all items, with higher scores indi-
cating greater belief that the 7/7 bombings were part of a
conspiratorial act. Previous work has shown that scores
on this measure are signiﬁcantly correlated with scores
on the GCBS (r = .67, N = 205; Brotherton et al., 2013) and
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ent study, Cronbach’s a for this measure was .90.
5.1.2.3. Analytic processing of information. As a manipula-
tion check, we included the one-item Moses Illusion task
(Erickson & Mattson, 1981; for details, see Study 2), which
assesses analytic versus experiential processing of
information.
5.1.3. Design and procedure
In broad outline, we followed the recruitment strategy
outlined in Study 1. Potential participants were invited to
take part in a study on well-being and education (used as
a cover for the present work) and were provided with an
information sheet that contained more information about
the study. Participants who agreed to take part in the study
provided written informed consent and were randomly
assigned to the Control (n = 66) or Disﬂuent groups
(n = 74). All participants completed a paper-and-pencil
survey, with instructions presented on a cover sheet in
an easy-to-read font for all participants (so as to minimise
experimenter bias). Participants in the Control group com-
pleted the survey in the same easy-to-read font (black
Arial, font size 12), while the Disﬂuent group completed
the survey in a difﬁcult to read font (grey Brush Script
MT, font size 12). The results of the pilot study in Study 3
showed that the latter font was rated as signiﬁcantly more
difﬁcult to read that the former font. The survey also
included several ﬁller scales not related to the present
work and included in order to minimise the potential for
hypothesis-guessing. The order of presentation of all scales
was pre-randomised for all participants, with a request for
demographic information (sex, age, highest educational
qualiﬁcations, ethnicity) always appearing last. Upon com-
pletion of the survey, participants received a debrief sheet
containing further information about the study and the
contact details of the ﬁrst author. All participants took part
on a voluntary basis and were paid £1.50 for participation.
5.2. Results and discussion
To check that the experimental manipulation was suc-
cessful at eliciting analytic processing, we examined
responses on the Moses Illusion task. Results indicated that
participants were signiﬁcantly more likely to respond with
the correct answer in the Disﬂuent condition (35%) com-
pared with the Control condition (12%), v2(1) = 10.05,
p = .002. In addition, there were no signiﬁcant between-
group differences on mean age, t(138) = 0.42, p = .674,
d = 0.07, and the distribution of ethnicities, v2(2) = 2.14,
p = .343, / = .12, and educational qualiﬁcations,
v2(4) = 2.45, p = .654. Responses on the Moses Illusion task
was not signiﬁcantly correlated with educational status in
this sample, rs = .10, p = .229.
An independent-samples t-test revealed that partici-
pants in the Disﬂuent group (M = 2.56, SD = 0.89) had sig-
niﬁcantly lower generic conspiracist ideation than
participants in the Control group (M = 2.90, SD = 0.70),
t(138) = 2.49, p = .014, d = 0.42. Similarly, participants in
the Disﬂuent group (M = 2.70, SD = 1.20) had signiﬁcantly
lower belief in conspiracy theories of the 7/7 bombingscompared with participants in the Control group
(M = 3.13, SD = 1.34), t(138) = 2.01, p = .046, d = 0.34. These
results support the conclusions drawn in Studies 2 and 3
about the effects of eliciting analytic processing, but
extend it to a general population sample in relation to gen-
eric conspiracist ideation and a speciﬁc conspiracy theory.6. General discussion
The results of Study 1 showed that belief in conspiracy
theories were associated with thinking dispositions, partic-
ularly analytic and intuitive thinking styles. More than this,
further studies indicated that experimental manipulations
eliciting analytic thinking were effective at reducing belief
in conspiracy theories (Studies 2 and 3), generic conspira-
cist ideation, and belief in conspiracy theories about the 7/
7 London bombings (Study 4). Of course, alternative expla-
nations may be postulated to account for the results of
individual studies reported here. Across all four studies,
however, the most parsimonious explanation appears to
be that eliciting analytic thinking reduces belief in conspir-
acy theories, which would be consistent with other work
showing similar effects on belief systems that bear the
hallmarks of experiential information processing (Gervais
& Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012; Shenhav
et al., 2012). Certainly, the hypothesis that analytic think-
ing reduces conspiracist ideation is consistent with previ-
ous experimental work (Banas & Miller, 2013; Swami
et al., 2013) and commentary (Blair, 2012; Leman, 2007).
These ﬁndings raise important questions about how
speciﬁcally analytic processing of information inﬂuences
belief in conspiracy theories. The most straight-forward
answer to this question is that analytic thinking prompts
careful and deliberate processing of information (Chaiken
et al., 1989), which increases attention to the logical falla-
cies and factual inaccuracies inherent in most conspiracy
theories. That is, analytic processing of information may
inhibit intuitions and biases that support the assimilation
and acceptance of conspiracy theories. For example, ana-
lytic thinking may attenuate the effects of heuristics and
biases that are known to affect belief in conspiracy theories
(Brotherton & French, 2014; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007).
However, given the relatively large effects we have uncov-
ered, it seems unlikely that this is the only way in which
conspiracist ideation is inhibited.
Another way in which analytic thinking styles may
affect conspiracist ideation is through the provision of
space and tools with which to override any pre-existing
conspiracist ideation. That is, inducing analytic thinking
styles may assist individuals to re-evaluate the evidence
against a conspiracist worldview in general or conspiracist
statements in particular. One way of testing this in future
work would be to see whether inducing analytic thinking
translated into longer reaction times in responding to a
measure of conspiracist beliefs. Alternatively, it may also
be possible that individuals who have been primed to
thinking analytically do not scrutinise all the available evi-
dence, but rather merely select responses that appear more
‘rational’ to them. For example, among individuals who are
uncertain about their beliefs or who have suspicions about
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would be to not endorse such statements. Finally, another
way of answering this question would be is to focus on
conspiracy theories themselves: because conspiracy theo-
ries typically require lower cognitive effort and tend to
trigger affective feelings (Swami & Furnham, 2014), they
may be more likely to appeal to an experiential thinking
style.
An alternative explanation for our ﬁndings is that our
results are reﬂective of the broad reach of analytic think-
ing. That is, given that our work replicates previous ﬁnd-
ings showing that analytic thinking reduces religious
beliefs (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012), it is possible that
analytic thinking boosts scepticism toward any sort of
belief. In other words, analytically thinking individuals
may be less willing to endorse any given statement. The
fact that none of our dependent measures included
reverse-coded items makes this difﬁcult to test in the pres-
ent study. Another possibility is that analytic thinking
affects conspiracist ideation via mediating variables that
are known to affect the latter, such as self-esteem. In a sim-
ilar vein, it is also possible that the experimental methods
used in our studies facilitated, not analytic thinking per se,
but rather correlates of analytic thinking. To take one
example, the effect of the prime in Study 2 may have been
to promote improved monitoring of intuitive responses
(see Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011) or
conﬂict detection processes (i.e., determining whether
one’s intuitions conﬂict with normative considerations;
De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). A similar criticism can be lev-
elled at Studies 3 and 4: it is possible that unexpected
moderator variables affected our results. For example,
one possibility is that a hard-to-read font affects analytic
thinking indirectly via diligence (Alter & Oppenheimer,
2009); that is, in the hard-to-read condition, respondents
may have been more wary and thus attended to the mate-
rials for longer and more thoroughly (Thompson et al.,
2013), which in turn (and indirectly) affects analytic think-
ing. The possibility of unmeasured variables exerting an
inﬂuence on our ﬁndings through moderator effects on
analytic thinking is one that cannot be ruled out by the
present studies, which in turn requires further
investigation.
Furthermore, we are not suggesting that thinking dispo-
sitions are the only, or even the most important, factor to
affect belief in conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories
are associated with a range of cultural, social, cognitive,
and individual difference factors (for reviews, see Swami
& Coles, 2010; Swami & Furnham, 2014) and, while the
present work suggests one possible cognitive source, it will
be important for future work to establish the relationship
between thinking dispositions and other identiﬁed vari-
ables in shaping belief in conspiracy theories. In a similar
vein, the mean responses to our measures of conspiracist
ideation suggest a relatively low level of agreement with
conspiracy theories across our samples. Among such
respondents, analytic thinking may have had attenuating
effect because of the resultant skepticism towards poten-
tially illogical claims. By contrast, among individuals who
very strongly believe in conspiracy theories, individual dif-
ferences in analytic thinking may not be sufﬁcientlypervasive to reduce conspiracist ideation. This is an issue
worthy of future study, although there may be difﬁculties
in recruiting an appropriate sample.
Furthermore, although the multiple studies suggest that
our results are robust, future work could employ alterna-
tive methods of eliciting analytic thinking, such as the
visual priming paradigm developed by Gervais and
Norenzayan (2012) or asking participants to adopt the per-
spective of another (e.g., Beatty & Thompson, 2012). In a
similar vein, a useful avenue for future research would be
to examine the effects of either eliciting intuitive thinking
or interfering with analytic thinking on belief in conspiracy
theories. Another area of our study that requires further
attention is the generalisability of our ﬁndings to different
cultural and political contexts. As Swami (2012) has noted,
actors may adopt conspiracy theories for varying func-
tional roles in different cultural contexts. As such, it will
be important to replicate our ﬁndings in those cultural
contexts where conspiracy theories serve political or socio-
economic functions not typically fulﬁlled in Western
Europe and North America (e.g., to establish and maintain
social dominance or distance; Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2014;
Swami, 2012). Finally, if our ﬁndings are to be of practical
value, it will be important to establish the extent to which
engaging analytic thinking results in long-term change in
conspiracist ideation. Longitudinal work and interven-
tion-based programmes aimed at promoting analytic
thinking would no doubt help to shed light on these issues.
In conclusion, the present work demonstrates that
eliciting analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy
theories, at least in the short term. Although it is widely-
thought that belief in conspiracy theories are resistant to
change, recent work indicates that it is possible to reduce
belief in conspiracy theories through the use of critical,
logical, and fact-based arguments (Banas & Miller, 2013;
Swami et al., 2013). Our ﬁndings contribute to this body
of work in showing that an analytic thinking style can
result in decreased conspiracist ideation. More broadly,
our work suggests that, if policy-makers are concerned
about the negative outcomes associated with belief in con-
spiracy theories, supporting the development of analytic
thinking skills may be a useful beginning. For scholars,
understanding these associations may be an important
step forward in formulating more elaborate theoretical
models that explain the widespread acceptance of conspir-
acy theories in contemporary societies.References
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